OPTIMIZATION STRATEGY FOR LOW-CARBON COOPERATION OF MULTI-DISTRICT INTEGRATED ENERGY SERVICE PROVIDERS CONSIDERING DYNAMIC PRICING AND CARBON TRADING

被引:0
|
作者
Li R. [1 ]
Lyu H. [1 ]
Peng X. [1 ]
Wang B. [1 ]
Zhu J. [2 ]
机构
[1] College of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, North China Electric Power University, Baoding
[2] College of Economic and Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing
来源
关键词
carbon trading; dynamic pricing; integrated energy markets; multi- district integrated energy service providers; Nash bargaining;
D O I
10.19912/j.0254-0096.tynxb.2022-1751
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
To address the issues of benefit distribution and dynamic pricing brought about by the participation of multi- district integrated energy service providers(MDIESP) in the integrated energy and carbon trading markets,this paper proposed a new cooperative trading framework for MDIESP. Firstly,a collaborative trading mechanism for MDIESP was designed under the stepped carbon trading mechanism. Dynamic pricing was formulated for the upper- level regional retail market to guide the energy purchase behavior of each district service provider. Secondly,under the gradual construction of a new power system,the carbon quota and emission model was improved according to the change in the proportion of new energy,and the carbon emissions of each district were constrained through a stepped carbon trading mechanism in the market. Finally,a Nash bargaining model was established for multi-district service providers,decomposing the model into sub-problems of alliance cost minimization and negotiation of electricity and heat trading payments. It proves that the proposed model and method can improve the initiative of each district to participate in the coalition and effectively reduce the carbon emission and total operation cost of each district. © 2024 Science Press. All rights reserved.
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页码:337 / 346
页数:9
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