Strictly pure nash equilibria and expected equilibria in a symmetrical 0-1game and its dual game

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作者：
Jiang, Dianyu [1 ]
机构：
[1] Institute of Game Theory with Applications, Huaihai Institute of Technology, No. 59 Cangwu Road, Xinpu, Lianyungang-city 222005, China
来源：
ICIC Express Letters | 2009年 / 3卷 / 03期
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摘要：
22
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页码：295 / 300
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