Analysis of Evolution of Dynamic Game Strategy for Multi-participants in Railway Passenger Transport Service

被引：0
|
作者：
Liu J. [1 ]
Liu S. [1 ]
Zhuang J. [2 ]
机构：
[1] School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing
[2] Department of Technical Management, Planning and Standard Institute of National Railway Administration, Beijing
来源：
Tiedao Xuebao/Journal of the China Railway Society | 2022年 / 44卷 / 09期
关键词：
Dynamic game; Evolution path; Multi-participants; Railway passenger transport; Sensitivity;
D O I：
10.3969/j.issn.1001-8360.2022.09.002
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
With the in-depth integration of the information industry and the continuous refinement of social division of labor, China's railway passenger transport service has gradually changed from being single and generic in the initial stage to being diversified and personalized in the current stage. The main participants of railway passenger transport service mainly include three types: government supervision departments, service providers and passengers. As the main participants of China's high-speed railway passenger transport service are stepping into a stage of the new normal and diversification, this paper studied the evolution of the dynamic game strategy of railway passenger transport service participants based on the perspective of market economy behavior and the method of game theory. Based on the analysis of the game evolution process of three high-speed railway passenger service participants, including government supervision departments, passenger transport service providers and passengers, the evolution path of the dynamic game driven by government regulation was determined. The conditions for realizing pareto optimal strategy equilibrium were analyzed, and the sensitivity of the influence factors of each participant on the evolution of the game was analyzed through an example, which provides a basis for the stability strategy suggestions for each participant. © 2022, Department of Journal of the China Railway Society. All right reserved.
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页码：9 / 16
页数：7
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