Engineering game theory: Motivations, principles, and applications in engineering decision-making problems

被引:0
|
作者
Mei S.-W. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Liu F. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] The Department of Electrical Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing
[2] The State Key Laboratory of Power System Operation and Control, Beijing
[3] School of Energy, Qinghai University, Qinghai, Xining
关键词
energy systems; engineering game theory; game theory; optimal decision-making; power;
D O I
10.7641/CTA.2024.30709
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In the face of complex engineering problems with multiple decision-makers, multiple objectives, and uncertainties, traditional optimal decision-making methodologies often struggle to deliver satisfactory results. In this regard, we propose “Engineering Game Theory” as a new solution methodology, inspired by Hsue-Shen TSIEN’s famous book “Engineering Cybernetics”. This innovative decision-making theory applies game-theoretic concepts, modeling methods, and analytics to address large-scale engineering decision-making problems with complicated technical requirements in practice. This paper explains the concept of “coordinating conflicts through equilibrium strategies” and introduces three fundamental principles of engineering game theory, including: 1) the non-cooperative game-theoretic principle for uncertain engineering decision-making and control problems; 2) the cooperative game-theoretic principle for multi-objective engineering decision-making problems; and 3) the evolutionary game-theoretic principle for multi-stakeholder planning problems. Typical applications in power and energy industries are also provided. We expect this paper could attract more and more researchers to participate and contribute to perfecting the fundamental theories and methodologies in this promising direction and further promote the applications of engineering game theory in a broader range of engineering fields. © 2024 South China University of Technology. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1159 / 1171
页数:12
相关论文
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