Green supply chain game models considering risk aversion under information asymmetry

被引：0
|
作者：
Cai J. [1 ,2 ]
Jiang L. [2 ]
Yang M. [2 ]
Ma X. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Experimental Center of Data Science and Intelligent Decision-Making, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hangzhou
[2] School of Management, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hangzhou
来源：
Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2024年 / 44卷 / 05期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
green supply chain; information asymmetry; risk aversion; Stackelberg game;
D O I：
10.12011/SETP2023-1460
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper studies the optimal decisions of the green supply chain (GSC) under demand information asymmetry, and mainly focuses the following three situations: Both the manufacturer and the retailer are risk averse, only the retailer is risk averse, and only the manufacturer is risk averse. The impacts of risk-aversion coefficient and information asymmetry on the GSC members’ optimal decisions and utilities are discussed. Then, the cost-sharing contracts are introduced to optimize the GSC’s performance under three situations. The results show that: The GSC’s equilibrium solutions are influenced by the value of risk-aversion coefficient, and the joint impact of green degree and retail price on the market demand; under three situations, information asymmetry always reduces the manufacturer’s utility, and it is not necessarily beneficial to the retailer, which is related to the demand information value evaluated by the manufacturer; whether the information is symmetric or not, the preference sequences of the manufacturer and the retailer for three situations are fixed; meanwhile, given specific conditions, the cost-sharing contracts can improve the products’ green degree and help the GSCs achieve Pareto improvements under three situations. © 2024 Systems Engineering Society of China. All rights reserved.
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收藏
页码：1615 / 1632
页数：17
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