Behind Israel's 2006 war with Hezbollah

被引:0
|
作者
Lambeth, Benjamin S. [1 ]
机构
[1] Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, United States
来源
Air Force Magazine | 2011年 / 94卷 / 09期
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D O I
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中图分类号
V271.4 [军用飞机(战机)];
学科分类号
摘要
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a campaign in 2006 against the Hezbollah organization in response to a surprise cross-border incursion from southern Lebanon into Israel. The Israeli counteroffensive, codenamed Operation Change of Direction, included the most complex and sophisticated air operation in Israel's history. The IDF's Chief of Staff Lt. General Dan Halutz largely determined the campaign's conduct. As the first day of combat ended, it became clear that Israel's strategy, for the time being, was to rely solely on precision standoff attacks to coerce Hezbollah's fiery leader, Hassan Nasrallah, to do its bidding. The IDF's ground commanders also opposed a major land counteroffensive because their troops were totally unprepared for combat against a robust opponent such as Hezbollah. From start to finish, IDF ground activity lacked a clearly identifiable pattern. Another source of trouble for the campaign plan as it unfolded was the IDF's ground forces' lack of preparation for serious combat against Hezbollah's well-trained and disciplined fighters.
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页码:112 / 116
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