Executive Power, Heterogeneity of Institutional Investors and the Speed of Capital Structure Adjustment

被引：0
|
作者：
Hou L. [1 ]
Zhong T.-L. [1 ]
Zhang T.-Y. [1 ]
机构：
[1] School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang
来源：
Dongbei Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Northeastern University | 2018年 / 39卷 / 07期
关键词：
Capital structure; Executive power; Heterogeneity; Institutional investors' holding; Speed of adjustment;
D O I：
10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2018.07.028
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The fixed effect model based on the data of China's A-share listed companies in 2000~2015 was used to analyze the effect of executive power on the speed of capital structure adjustment. Then the effect of institutional investors' holding and its heterogeneity on the relationship between executive power and the speed of capital structure adjustment was further investigated. The results showed that the more powerful an executive has, the lower the speed of capital structure adjustment would be. After distinguishing different debt levels, the negative relationship between executive power and the speed of capital structure adjustment exists only when the actual captical structure is lower than the target level. On the whole, institutional investors' holding has no significant influence on the relationship between executive power and the speed of capital structure adjustment. However, stable institutional investors' holding can weaken the negative correlation between executive power and the speed of capital structure adjustment with respect to short-termism institutional investors. It contributes to the restraint of executive power and optimizes the decision making of capital structure. © 2018, Editorial Department of Journal of Northeastern University. All right reserved.
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页码：1053 / 1058
页数：5
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