Survey of false data injection attacks in power transmission systems

被引：0
|
作者：
Wang X. [1 ]
Tian M. [1 ]
Dong Z. [2 ]
Zhu G. [1 ]
Long J. [1 ]
Dai D. [1 ]
Zhang Q. [3 ]
机构：
[1] Electronic Information School, Wuhan University, Wuhan, 430072, Hubei Province
[2] School of Power and Mechanical Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan, 430072, Hubei Province
[3] College of Mathematics and Computer, Hubei University of Art and Science, Xiangyang, 441053, Hubei Province
来源：
Dianwang Jishu | / 11卷 / 3406-3414期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
False data injection attacks; Information security; L[!sub]0[!/sub]-norm; Residue; State estimation;
D O I：
10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2016.11.019
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
False data injection attacks (FDIAs) take advantage of flaws of bad data detection in transmission system state estimate based on residue. By injecting false data to supervisory control and data acquisition(SCADA) system, FDIAs attackers can achieve some illegal goals, such as modifying measurements and state variables, controlling operations, gaining profits, etc. Fundamental theories and implementation mechanism of FDIAs were illustrated. State-of-arts of FDIAs were teased out from perspective of attack strategies and countermeasures, information integrity of power systems, extended attacking methods of FDIAs and optimization of attacking vectors. Advantages and disadvantages of different research results were also analyzed. Effects of FDIAs on distributed state estimation, FDIAs in hybrid SCADA/PMU measurements and countermeasures based on multi-agent were prospected. © 2016, Power System Technology Press. All right reserved.
引用
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页码：3406 / 3414
页数：8
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