A State-of-the-Art Review on Stackelberg Game and Its Applications in Power Market

被引:0
|
作者
Zhang H. [1 ]
Zhang S. [1 ]
Cheng H. [1 ]
Zhang X. [2 ]
Gu Q. [3 ]
机构
[1] Key Laboratory of Control of Power Transmission and Conversion, Ministry of Education, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai
[2] Shanghai Electric Power Company Shibei Power Supply Company, Shanghai
[3] Electric Power Research Institute, State Grid Henan Electric Power Company, Zhengzhou
关键词
Game theory; power market; power system optimization; sequential game; Stackelberg game;
D O I
10.19595/j.cnki.1000-6753.tces.210663
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
With increasing penetration of renewables to the electricity grid, commercialization of energy storage technology, diversification of demand side management resources type, and maturity of multi-energy complementation, more and more stakeholders are being progressively introduced into source-grid-load of power systems. However, due to trading volume and market position, the decision-makers have different priorities. The application of Stackelberg game theory, which has master-slave hierarchical structure, was investigated in this manuscript to solve sequential decision-making problems in investment and energy trading under the deregulated environment. Firstly, the mathematical structure of Stackelberg game was described, and it was classified according to the number of players in the master/slave problems; then, the application of Stackelberg game in power market was sorted out, and equivalent transformation skills, the advantages and disadvantages of various solving methods were summarized; finally, the key scientific problems still existing in the application of Stackelberg game in power market were refined. It is hoped that the work can provide a method reference for those stakeholders who participate in sequential decision-making in power market. © 2022 Chinese Machine Press. All rights reserved.
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页码:3250 / 3262
页数:12
相关论文
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