Equilibrium analysis for affiliated effort contests model

被引：0
|
作者：
Wang, Xian-Jia [1 ,2 ]
Chen, Wen-Lei [1 ]
Fan, Wen-Tao [3 ]
机构：
[1] School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
[2] Hubei Province Key Laboratory of Systems Science for Metallurgical Industry Process, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430081, China
[3] Wuhan Institute of Physics and Mathematics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan 430071, China
来源：
Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2010年 / 30卷 / 03期
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页码：501 / 505
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