Bidding Strategy of Load Aggregators and Market Equilibrium Analysis for Multi-variety Electricity Market Trading

被引：0
|
作者：
Wang P. [1 ]
He H. [1 ]
Fu L. [2 ]
Wang Y. [1 ]
Dai Y. [1 ]
机构：
[1] School of Electrical & Electronic Engineering, North China Electric Power University, Beijing
[2] Inner Mongolia Electric Power Marketing Service Company, Hohhot
来源：
Dianli Xitong Zidonghua/Automation of Electric Power Systems | 2024年 / 48卷 / 04期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
bi-level optimization; bidding strategy; load aggregator; market equilibrium; multi-variety electricity trading; strong stationary method (SSM);
D O I：
10.7500/AEPS20230313004
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The construction of the new power system in China is facing the challenge of a shortage of flexible resources, and it is urgent to exert the adjustment ability of load side. As the mutual interaction between the power grid and load becomes more frequent, more load aggregators participate in market transactions by integrating jurisdictional flexible resources, resulting in the break of the market equilibrium dominated by the power generation side in the past. In order to study the game strategy of multi-agent load aggregators, a bi-level bidding model of load aggregators under energy-reserve electricity market is constructed, and multiple scenarios are introduced to describe the influence of bidding uncertainty of non-decision makers on the market equilibrium. The multiple bi-level models are transformed into an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) model by strong stationary method (SSM), and linearization methods such as big-M method and binary expansion approach are used for linearization. Results of the example validate the validity and effectiveness of the model and solving algorithm, demonstrating that the EPEC model based optimal bidding strategy of load aggregators is more in line with the actual market rules, which is helpful to optimize the load curve of the system and alleviate the tension between the supply and demand of flexible resources. © 2024 Automation of Electric Power Systems Press. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：111 / 122
页数：11
相关论文
共 27 条
  • [1] FAN Shuai, Yihan WEI, HE Guangyu, Et al., Discussion on demand response mechanism for new power systems ［J］, Automation of Electric Power Systems, 46, 7, pp. 1-12, (2022)
  • [2] HE Qinman, LIU Xiaofeng, WANG Qi, Et al., Scheduling strategy of load aggregator considering priority classification of electricity consumption satisfaction ［J］, Power System Technology, 45, 7, pp. 2666-2675, (2021)
  • [3] SUN Lingling, GAO Ciwei, TAN Jian, Et al., Load aggregation technology and its applications［J］, Automation of Electric Power Systems, 41, 6, pp. 159-167, (2017)
  • [4] DONG J，, Et al., Tri-level scheduling model considering residential demand flexibility of aggregated HVACs and EVs under distribution LMP ［J］, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 12, 5, pp. 3990-4002, (2021)
  • [5] Notice on further deepening the marketization reform of on-grid electricity price of coal-fired power generation ［EB/OL］
  • [6] QIAO W., Finding equilibria in the pool-based electricity market with strategic wind power producers and network constraints［J］, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 32, 1, pp. 389-399, (2017)
  • [7] GUO Hongye, CHEN Qixin, XIA Qing, Et al., Flexible ramping product in electricity markets：basic concept，equilibrium model and research prospect［J］, Proceedings of the CSEE, 37, 11, pp. 3057-3066, (2017)
  • [8] Yan DU, Fangxing LI, ZANDI H，, Et al., Approximating Nash equilibrium in day-ahead electricity market bidding with multi-agent deep reinforcement learning［J］, Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy, 9, 1, pp. 170-180, (2021)
  • [9] Pool equilibria including strategic storage［J］, Applied Energy, 177, 1, pp. 260-270, (2016)
  • [10] LU Zhilin, SHANG Nan, ZHANG Yan, Et al., Nash-Stackelberg game model for power generation enterprises participating in capacity market［J］, Automation of Electric Power Systems, 47, 16, pp. 94-102, (2023)
123