Game models andprofit-sharing contract of green supply chain based on multi-objective optimization

被引：0
|
作者：
Jian J. [1 ]
Guo Y. [1 ]
Jiang L. [1 ]
Su J. [2 ]
机构：
[1] School of Modern Post, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing
[2] Chongqing Municipal Key Laboratory of Electronic Commerce & Supply Chain System, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing
来源：
Jisuanji Jicheng Zhizao Xitong/Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, CIMS | 2021年 / 27卷 / 03期
关键词：
Environmental benefits; Game model; Green supply chain; Multi-objective optimization; Profit-sharing contract;
D O I：
10.13196/j.cims.2021.03.025
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
To research the influence of environmental benefits on optimal decision for green supply chain, a supply chain game model with profit and environment simultaneously considered by manufacturer was constructed based on multi-objective optimization and game theory, the decision for supply chain model under centralized, manufacturer-led Stackelberg game and profit-sharing contract was analyzed, and the above three equilibrium results were compared. The results showed that the manufacturer's profit would be reduced after considering the target of environmental benefits, while the retailer's profit, product greenness and environmental benefits was increased. However, a profit-sharing contract could realize multi-coordination of product green degree, profit and environmental benefits of the whole supply chain. © 2021, Editorial Department of CIMS. All right reserved.
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页码：943 / 953
页数：10
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