An evolutionary game of carbon subsidy policy considering consumption field

Considering that the low-carbon strategies of enterprises and consumers are often affected by government subsidy policies, this paper constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of consumers, relevant enterprise and the government, and discussed the influence mechanism of various factors on the strategy choice of each subject. The results show that: The low-carbon behaviors of enterprises are positively driven by government subsidies, low carbon preference of consumers, opportunity cost of giving up low-carbon production and market loss, and negatively driven by the cost of production mode change; The low-carbon behaviors of consumers are positively driven by the intensity of government subsidies and the benefit of low carbon preference, and negatively driven by the price difference between low-carbon products and ordinary products; The government chooses to subsidize consumers only when the potential benefits exceed the difference between the cost of consumption subsidy and production subsidy process; otherwise, the government is more inclined to subsidize production. This paper used simulation tools to verify the above conclusions, which helped to promote all mitigation actions countermeasures and suggestions were put forward. © 2022, Editorial Board of China Environmental Science. All right reserved.