Duopoly Benefit Distribution Mechanism Under Multi-station Integration Based on Stackelberg Model

被引：0

作者：

Xie Z. ^{[1
]}

Tang H. ^{[1
]}

Han X. ^{[2
]}

Zhang C. ^{[2
]}

Sun Y. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] College of Information and Electrical Engineering, China Agricultural University, Haidian District, Beijing

[2] State Grid Energy Research Institute Co., Ltd., Changping District, Beijing

[3] Economic and Technology Research Institute, State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co., Ltd., Hangzhou

来源：

Dianwang Jishu/Power System Technology | 2021年 / 45卷 / 10期

关键词：

Benefit distribution; Multi-station integration; Power internet of things; Revenue sharing; Stackelberg game model;

D O I：

10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2021.0185

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Under the scenario of integration of the substations and the data center station, the profit distribution mechanism of the power grid enterprises and the network operators is studied based on the Stackelberg model considering the customer service level and the flow package prices. By means of cost-benefit analysis, centralized decision allocation mode and decentralized decision allocation mode including fixed payment mode, revenue sharing mode, cost sharing and revenue sharing mode are compared. Cost sharing and revenue sharing coordination mechanism is the best choice for the power grid enterprises and the network operators, and cost sharing coefficient and benefit sharing coefficient can be calculated and adjusted to make the power grid enterprises and network operators get profits no less than other distribution methods under decentralized decision allocation mode to achieve Pareto improvement. Then the influence of the change of cost sharing coefficient, revenue sharing coefficient and customer service level on the distribution mode is analyzed quantitatively. © 2021, Power System Technology Press. All right reserved.

引用

页码：4009 / 4015

页数：6

共 23 条

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