Research on differential game of default control in crowdsourcing logistics distribution considering public activity

被引：0
|
作者：
Wu X. [1 ]
Yang L. [1 ]
Shi Z. [1 ]
机构：
[1] College of Modem Posts, Xi’an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Xi’an
来源：
Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2023年 / 43卷 / 12期
关键词：
crowdsourcing logistics; default control; differential game; public activity;
D O I：
10.12011/SETP2022-1108
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
How to prevent the risk of violation in the distribution process by controlling the violation behavior of the participants? The differential game theory is applied to study the strategic problem of crowdsourcing logistics distribution participants controlling illegal behavior considering public activity. The partial differential equations of the optimal control problem of the participants under centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making are respectively constructed. The influence of public activity, reward and punishment factors and proportion of sharing on participants’ efforts to control illegal behaviors was discussed. The results of the study are as follows. From decentralized decision-making to crowdsourcing platform incentive decentralized decision-making, and then to centralize decision-making, the level of efforts to control violations and the overall income shows an increasing trend. Crowdsourcing platform can influence public activity by adjusting reward and punishment factor and the proportion of cost-sharing. When the activity level is in the range [0.8, 1], the effort level of participants to control violations under decentralized decision is close to that under the centralized decision, and the fluctuation of the number of violations tends to be flat, which promotes the overall increase of the revenue of crowdsourcing logistics. © 2023 Systems Engineering Society of China. All rights reserved.
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页码：3606 / 3618
页数：12
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