Joint pricing and launching strategy for bike-sharing enterprises based on Bertrand game

Based on the randomness of shared bicycle rental, this paper uses Bertrand game theory to construct a model of joint decision making of rental pricing and launching between shared bicycle enterprises in a random environment, and studies the optimal strategy combination of price and quantity of shared bicycle enterprises in two cases: differential pricing and collaborative pricing. The paper analyzes the impact of market potential demand and vehicle area coverage difficulty on the corporate strategy and operating profit. The research shows that: 1) In the case of differential pricing, when the demand for shared-bikes is satisfied with probability, there is a unique Nash equilibrium solution for the game between bike-sharing enterprises, and when the pricing power of low-price enterprises increases, the profits of both companies will gain growth; 2) In the case of collaborative pricing, the average rental price of the shared bicycle market is lower and increases with the potential demand of the market, but the growth rate is smaller than the differential pricing situation; 3) Collaborative pricing is conducive to maintaining the profit of bike-sharing enterprises when the market size is small, while differential pricing is conducive to restraining the excessive release of shared bikes when the market size expands. Copyright ©2021 Control and Decision.