Are Bankruptcy Professional Fees Excessively High?

被引:0
|
作者
Antill, Samuel [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Sch Business, Boston, MA 02163 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
G33; G38; K22; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; COSTS; MODEL;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhae057
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Chapter 7 is the most popular bankruptcy system for U.S. firms and individuals. Chapter 7 professional fees are substantial. Theoretically, high fees might be an unavoidable cost of incentivizing professionals. I test this empirically. I study trustees, the most important professionals in chapter 7, who liquidate assets in exchange for legally mandated commissions. Exploiting kinks in the commission function, I estimate a structural model of moral hazard by trustees. I show that a policy change lowering trustee fees would harm trustee incentives, reducing liquidation values. Nonetheless, such a policy would dramatically improve creditor recovery, increasing small-business-lender recovery by 15.7%.
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页数:53
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