Understanding disagreements: a necessary explanation about the theoretical foundations in the legal-scientific discussion

被引:0
|
作者
Streck, Lenio Luiz [1 ]
Madalena, Luis Henrique Braga [1 ]
Quarelli, Vinicius [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Vale Do Rio Dos Sinos, Sao Leopoldo, RS, Brazil
[2] Acad Brasileira Direito Constituc, Curitiba, PR, Brazil
来源
DIREITO E PRAXIS | 2024年 / 15卷 / 02期
关键词
Theory of Law; Philosophy in Law; Disagreements; Hermeneutics; Hermeneutic Critique of Law;
D O I
10.1590/2179-8966/2022/69069
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
These reflections intend to explore the limits of theoretical criticism and establish a minimum agreement about the theoretical frameworks involved in a discussion. It takes care of something here called Understanding Disagreements. As a general objective, it is proposed to investigate how a theoretical critique should be formulated and what are the limits of this formulation. In terms of the research problem, clarify what is essential for a critique to be considered coherent, as well as what can make it incoherent. The hypothesis: theoretical discussions sometimes despise the very content they aim to examine and lack the rigor that practice demands. As for the "method", it uses hermeneutical phenomenology. For all these reasons, the reflections presented here are justified as an effort to remove the layers of meanings coagulated by legal dogmatics.
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页数:23
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