Commonsense morality and the bearable automaticity of being

被引:0
|
作者
Murray, Samuel [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Nadelhoffer, Thomas [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Los Andes, Lab Emoc & Juicios Morales, Bogota, Colombia
[2] Providence Coll, Philosophy Dept, Providence, RI 02918 USA
[3] Providence Coll, Neurosci Program, Providence, RI 02918 USA
[4] Coll Charleston, Philosophy Dept, Charleston, SC USA
关键词
Automaticity; Situationism; Free will; Agency; Decision-making; WATCHING EYES; VIRTUE ETHICS; FREE WILL; CHARACTER; SITUATIONISM; RESPONSIBILITY; DORIS; JOHN; ACTIVATION; PSYCHOLOGY; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1016/j.concog.2024.103748
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Some research suggests that moral behavior can be strongly influenced by trivial features of the environment of which we are completely unaware. Philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists have argued that these findings undermine our commonsense notions of agency and responsibility, both of which emphasize the role of practical reasoning and conscious deliberation in action. We present the results of four vignette-based studies (N=1,437) designed to investigate how people think about the metaphysical and moral implications of scientific findings that reveal our susceptibility to automaticity and situational influences. When presented with lightly fictionalized narratives about these findings, participants exhibit no tendency toward changing judgments of freedom and responsibility compared to control groups. This suggests that people seem unwilling to adopt skeptical attitudes about agency on the basis of these scientific findings.
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页数:19
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