Resilient automated intersection control of connected vehicles under denial of service attacks

This paper addresses the issue of automated intersection control for connected vehicles in the presence of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. DoS attacks can disrupt the vehicular communication network, leading to increased service time and additional transmission delays, thereby raising a risk of collisions at intersections. To mitigate this problem, we propose a resilient automated intersection control system that ensures safe passage of connected vehicles through non-signalized intersections. First, we establish a communication topology that captures the information transmission between vehicles using a vehicle conflict graph. This topology serves as the basis for designing a distributed control protocol that enables conflict-free cooperation at intersections, taking into account the stochastic delays caused by DoS attacks. To synthesize a resilient controller for the automated intersection control system, we employ the polytopic overapproximation technique based on the real Jordan form. This technique allows us to model the system dynamics and uncertainties, enabling the derivation of a set of sufficient conditions for system stability. By solving a series of linear matrix inequalities, we obtain the controller gains that satisfy these stability conditions. Numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed control method.