REMARKS ON GUSTAVO BONTADINI ON (HUSSERL'S) ⟪ONTOLOGICAL INTENTIONALITY⟫

This paper has a twofold objective. On the one hand, it offers a reconstruction of the way in which Gustavo Bontadini understands the function of Husserl's phenomenology within his own account of the history of modern philosophy (this being the more historical ambition of the present text). On the other hand, by tackling the systematic problem of how Bontadini understands the nature of > (the Unity of Experience or U OE), its goal is to outline a basic interpretation of Husserl's ontological intentionality. As will be argued, despite what Bontadini himself claims, Husserl's doctrine of intentionality and of the ontological import of intentionality cannot at all be superimposed on Bontadini's own view of UOE.