This study investigates the impact of the deleveraging policy on tunneling, using China's A-share listed firms. The deleveraging policy exacerbates tunneling and the result is robust after a series of tests. Further investigations show that tunneling of listed companies by non-state-owned controlling shareholders is particularly significant and audit opinions fail to reflect and inhibit tunneling. A way for large shareholders' tunneling under deleveraging is collusion with management.
机构:
Univ Sains Malaysia, Minden, Penang, Malaysia
Univ Sains Malaysia, Sch Management, Minden 11800, Penang, MalaysiaUniv Sains Malaysia, Minden, Penang, Malaysia
机构:
Nanjing Univ Informat Sci & Technol, Nanjing, Peoples R ChinaNanjing Univ Informat Sci & Technol, Nanjing, Peoples R China
Shen, Dongyang
He, Wenjian
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机构:
Nanjing Univ Informat Sci & Technol, Nanjing, Peoples R China
Nanjing Univ Informat Sci & Technol, Dev Inst Jiangbei New Area, Nanjing, Peoples R ChinaNanjing Univ Informat Sci & Technol, Nanjing, Peoples R China