Adjustment strategies and chaos in duopoly supply chains: The impacts of carbon trading markets and emission reduction policies

Low-carbon policies serve as a core incentive mechanism to promote carbon reduction in duopoly supply chains. However, their directive impact may cause product prices and carbon emission adjustment speeds to accelerate too quickly, thereby triggering market instability. Current research is noticeably lacking in discussions on optimal configurations of supply chain management strategies and policy implementation under market equilibrium conditions. Therefore, this paper utilizes game theory and chaos theory to explore the dynamic operational strategies and optimal profits of duopoly supply chains under a single carbon trading mechanism and considering carbon reduction incentives. The findings indicate: (1) Price adjustment parameters significantly affect both parties' equilibrium strategies and system stability; (2) An increase in carbon prices and carbon reduction incentive intensity both narrow the stable areas for pricing and reduction strategies; (3) Both manufacturers and remanufacturers experience higher optimal pricing, reduced carbon reductions on their part, and more carbon reductions on the part of their counterparts due to the escalating costs of carbon reduction; (4) While enhancing carbon reduction incentives significantly aids both parties in achieving carbon reductions, as the reduction effect gradually diminishes, it also compresses their profit margins, whereas an increase in carbon quotas can linearly enhance business profits.