Government policies on port resilience amid strike events-A two-stage Van Damme based tripartite evolutionary game

In contrast to natural phenomena, such as extreme weather, accidents, disasters, and public health emergencies, labor strikes are human-induced emergent circumstances arising from low real wages in most cases. During disputes with ports, the labor typically exerts control over the duration and scale of strikes to negotiate improved benefits, while port authorities may seek collaboration with neighboring ports to enhance resilience and mitigate transportation disruption risks. Should the government participate as a third party in the game as an indirect stakeholder? The government must assess the necessity of engagement in the first stage and select an appropriate strategy in the second. Within the framework of tripartite equilibrium, this study examines the evolutionary paths of stability points, dual-stable states, and unstable states under different government engagement policies, as well as the influence of each factor on the tripartite strategy choice. The results reveal that (1) the right timing and policies for government engagement can mitigate more than half of the damage from the strike to the overall system; (2) port alliances can speed up 50 % of the evolution time of the labor to terminate the strike; (3) the government will play the dominant role when the risk of the strike to labor is increased; and (4) the expected duration of strikes can have an inverted "U"-shaped effect on port strategies but a "U"-shaped effect on government policies. The application of the two-stage evolutionary game model in this study develops an analytical framework that provides better reference for the government's actual decision-making.