POSTER: Stopping Run-Time Countermeasures in Cryptographic Primitives

White-box cryptographic implementations with masking and shuffling have been proposed to protect against key extraction attacks. However, higher-order Differential Computation Analysis (HO-DCA) and its variants have been developed to break these countermeasures without having to perform reverse engineering. These non-invasive attacks are, however, costly to perform and can also be prevented by adapting novel constructions of masking and shuffling methods. This poster presents a simple binary injection attack on state-of-the-art masking and shuffling countermeasures. By injecting just a few lines of assembly code, the attacker can nullify run-time random sources, rendering randomness ineffective in hiding key-sensitive intermediate values. Our proposed attack mainly consists of hijacking the GOT entries and function calls to overcome run-time countermeasures protecting white-box cryptographic implementations.