Why do entrepreneurial firms switch lead venture capital? A double-sided matching perspective

被引:0
|
作者
Liang, Weiping [1 ]
Zhou, Xiangyi [1 ]
机构
[1] Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Jinhe Ctr Econ Res, Xian, Peoples R China
关键词
Venture capital; Matching degree; Switching; Exit; INVESTMENT; REPUTATION; STRATEGIES; MONEY;
D O I
10.1016/j.ribaf.2024.102498
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper investigates the dynamics of a switch in the lead venture capital (VC) caused by a low degree of match between the entrepreneur and VC in the previous round of investing through theoretical and empirical analysis using a large sample from the Chinese venture capital market. The results show that the lower the degree of match is, the higher the likelihood that entrepreneurial firms will switch the lead VC. The rematching of firms and VCs is also a dynamic process of switching lead VCs in the venture capital market. Especially, in multiple rounds, for both subsamples of rising startup quality and rising VC quality, we find that the lower the matching degree in the previous round, the more likely a lead VC switch occurs. However, there is no significant difference in the effect of the matching degree in the previous round on the lead VC switch in the following round in both subsamples. We also show that a lead VC switch is more likely when startups are in the growth stage, mature stage, and high-tech industries. In addition, we confirm that a lead VC switch improves the success of startups. Specifically, whether the quality of a startup rises or falls, only lead VC switches at the early stage are conducive to the VC exits and the startup's success. In the early stage, the lead VC switch is a great shot in the arm for the company's success, whereas, in the later stage, the lead VC switch is only the icing on the cake.
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收藏
页数:20
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