Pareto optimal provisions as outcomes of voluntary public good supply

被引:0
|
作者
Buchholz, Wolfgang [1 ,2 ]
Kleinberg, Norman [3 ,4 ]
Ma, Barry [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Regensburg, Dept Econ, Regensburg, Germany
[2] CESifo Munich, Munich, Germany
[3] CUNY, Baruch Coll, Grad Ctr, Dept Econ & Finance, New York, NY 10031 USA
[4] CUNY, Grad Ctr, Econ Program, New York, NY 10031 USA
关键词
Public goods; Pareto optimal solutions; Samuelson condition; Nash equilibria; PRIVATE PROVISION;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111913
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
It is shown that a large set of public good supply levels that arise in a Pareto optimal allocation can also be attained as public good provisions in the Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative provision game. With a not very far-fetched assumption on agents' preferences this result even holds for all Pareto supply levels.
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页数:3
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