Seller-Orchestrated Inventory Financing Under Bank Capital Regulation

被引:1
|
作者
Zhang, Yuxuan [1 ]
Huang, Simin [2 ]
Yang, S. Alex [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Int Business & Econ, Sch Informat Technol & Management, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Tsinghua Univ, Dept Ind Engn, Beijing, Peoples R China
[3] London Business Sch, Management Sci & Operat, London NW1 4SA, England
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Supply chain management; operations-finance interface; bank capital regulation; joint finance program; seller-orchestrated inventory financing; risk pooling; TRADE CREDIT; TERM STRUCTURE; VS; BANK; RISK; MANAGEMENT; DEMAND; IMPACT; PERFORMANCE; FLEXIBILITY; SUPPLIERS;
D O I
10.1177/10591478241270121
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
To help small firms secure bank financing, large sellers often orchestrate joint finance programs, linking their small dealers with major banks that lend to all participating dealers based on the information the seller provides. We examine supply chain decisions (pricing and inventory) and lending terms under such seller-orchestrated financing programs. In loan pricing, we highlight a form of financial friction that is of particular importance under such schemes-bank capital regulation. Banks are globally mandated to maintain regulatory capital to mitigate unforeseen loan losses, using either the standardized approach (where regulatory capital is a fixed percentage of the loan amount) or the internal rating-based (IRB) approach (where it depends on the loan's value-at-risk). We consider a game-theoretic model consisting of a large seller and multiple capital-constrained newsvendor-type dealers, who obtain financing from banks that are subject to capital regulation. The seller decides the wholesale price and whether to orchestrate a joint finance program for its dealers by collaborating with a bank, and the dealers choose their inventory level and the financing channel. We find that a seller should only orchestrate the joint financing program when the bank adopts the IRB approach and the dealers are of low risk. Such a program is more profitable to the seller when the demand correlation among dealers is low, and there is a large number of dealers. Although always benefiting the seller, these programs may hurt dealers with intermediate risk. Facing dealers with varying financial situations, the terms under the joint finance program should be designed as if the financially strong dealers subsidize the weak ones. Finally, allowing the seller to share part of the loan loss could further enhance the performance of joint financing, but only when the seller's opportunity cost of capital is low. Our findings provide guidance to large sellers on how to orchestrate joint finance schemes, and to small dealers on making their corresponding operational decisions.
引用
收藏
页码:2259 / 2278
页数:20
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