Stability of networked evolutionary games with payoff perturbation

被引:0
|
作者
Wang, Ziyun [1 ]
Zhao, Xiaoyu [2 ]
Fu, Shihua [1 ]
机构
[1] Liaocheng Univ, Sch Math Sci, Liaocheng 252000, Peoples R China
[2] Shandong Univ, Sch Math, Jinan 250100, Peoples R China
关键词
game theory; stability; CONSENSUS; DYNAMICS; STRATEGY;
D O I
10.1049/cth2.12741
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
In networked evolutionary games (NEGs), some elements in the payoff matrix of players may change due to environmental factors. In this article, the stability of NEGs with payoff perturbation is studied using the semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices, and some new results are given. First, the perturbation of a column of the payoff matrix is considered, and a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that the transition matrix of the profiles evolution dynamics to remain unchanged is provided. Second, the case that multiple columns of the game profile transition matrix are perturbed is investigated, and a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of the NEGs is proposed. Finally, the validity of the results is illustrated by an example. First, the perturbation of a column of the payoff matrix is considered, and a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that the transition matrix of the profiles evolution dynamics to remain unchanged is provided. Second, the case that multiple columns of the game profile transition matrix are perturbed is investigated, and a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of the NEGs is proposed. image
引用
收藏
页码:2390 / 2397
页数:8
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