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Before thrive, first survive: The impact of controlling shareholder pledging on corporate ESG performance
被引:4
|作者:
Gao, Yang
[1
]
Ling, Yun
[2
]
Peng, Hui
[1
]
机构:
[1] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Econ, 1037 Luoyu Rd, Wuhan 430074, Peoples R China
[2] City Univ Macau, Fac Finance, Ave Padre Tomas Pereira, Taipa, Macau, Peoples R China
基金:
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词:
Agency problems;
Controlling shareholder pledging;
ESG;
Corporate monitoring;
SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY;
PRIVATE BENEFITS;
OWNERSHIP;
INVESTMENT;
CONFLICTS;
WEALTH;
POLICY;
D O I:
10.1016/j.pacfin.2024.102389
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
This paper investigates the impact of controlling shareholder pledging on corporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. Using data from Chinese listed firms, we show that controlling shareholder pledging significantly weakens firms' ESG performance and that this effect is robust to endogeneity and the choice of ESG metrics and controlling shareholder pledging measures. In addition, we show that the main channel through which ESG performance deteriorates for firms with controlling shareholder pledging is the risk of losing control. The adverse impact of controlling shareholder pledging on ESG is much less when control rights are not at risk. On the other hand, limited resources (e.g. tunnelling and financial constraints) contribute little to the impact. Our further analyses demonstrate that internal monitoring mechanisms can mitigate the negative impact of controlling shareholder pledging on corporate ESG performance, but external monitoring mechanisms cannot.
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页数:18
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