Tight last-iterate convergence rates for no-regret learning in multi-player games

被引:0
|
作者
Golowich, Noah [1 ]
Pattathil, Sarath [2 ]
Daskalakis, Constantinos [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT, CSAIL, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[2] MIT, EECS, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
DYNAMICS;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
We study the question of obtaining last-iterate convergence rates for no-regret learning algorithms in multi-player games. We show that the optimistic gradient (OG) algorithm with a constant step-size, which is no-regret, achieves a last-iterate rate of O(1/root T) with respect to the gap function in smooth monotone games. This result addresses a question of Mertikopoulos & Zhou (2018), who asked whether extra-gradient approaches (such as OG) can be applied to achieve improved guarantees in the multi-agent learning setting. The proof of our upper bound uses a new technique centered around an adaptive choice of potential function at each iteration. We also show that the O(1/root T) rate is tight for all p-SCLI algorithms, which includes OG as a special case. As a byproduct of our lower bound analysis we additionally present a proof of a conjecture of Arjevani et al. (2015) which is more direct than previous approaches.
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页数:13
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