Debtor income manipulation in consumer credit contracts

被引:0
|
作者
Mikhed, Vyacheslav [1 ]
Raina, Sahil [2 ]
Scholnick, Barry [2 ]
Zhang, Man [3 ]
机构
[1] Fed Reserve Bank Philadelphia, Consumer Finance Inst, Philadelphia, PA USA
[2] Univ Alberta, Alberta Sch Business, Edmonton, AB, Canada
[3] Natl Univ Singapore, Inst Real Estate & Urban Studies, Singapore City, Singapore
关键词
Consumer credit; Data misreporting; Financial distress; Default; BANKRUPTCY REFORM; ELASTICITIES EVIDENCE; MORTGAGE; IMPACT; NOTCHES; FRAUD;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103851
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We show that forcing insolvent consumer debtors to repay a larger fraction of debt causes them to strategically manipulate the data they report to creditors. Exploiting a policy change that required insolvent debtors to increase debt repayments at an arbitrary income cutoff, we document that some debtors reduce reported income to just below this cutoff to avoid the higher repayment. Those debtors who manipulate income have a lower probability of default on their repayment plans, consistent with having access to hidden income. We estimate this strategic manipulation costs creditors 12% to 36% of their total payout per filing.
引用
收藏
页数:20
相关论文
共 50 条