Evolutionary game analysis of shared parking market diffusion under government management

The imbalance between supply and demand in urban settings poses a significant barrier to the sustainable advancement of urban transportation. Shared parking serves as a viable solution to mitigate these challenges. Nevertheless, for its sustained growth, a regulatory mechanism enforced by the government is imperative. To promote shared parking market diffusion, we construct an evolutionary game model that incorporates the government, enterprises and parking demanders. It explores stabilization strategies for these stakeholders and identifies multiple equilibrium states under different parameter conditions. The results show that the rate and stability of these evolutionary strategies are constrained by the mutual benefits derived by the three parties. Furthermore, such stakeholders are reciprocally influenced by their willingness to engage in shared parking to varying degrees. Government subsidies serve as a determining factor for the strategic choices made by both enterprises and demanders, albeit at different evolutionary rates. Demanders who have a higher value of time tend to park on-street, thereby influencing enterprise strategies. To foster the long-term growth of the shared parking market, the government must enact appropriate subsidy policies, maintain consistent regulations and advocate for increased subsidies for parking demanders to reduce the effect of temporal heterogeneity on parking behavioural choices.