Iterated Admissibility does not Refine Extensive-form Rationalizability

被引:0
|
作者
Catonini, Emiliano [1 ]
机构
[1] New York Univ Shanghai, 567 West Yangsi Rd, Shanghai 200124, Peoples R China
来源
ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 2024年 / 134卷 / 663期
关键词
ORDER INDEPENDENCE; INDUCTION;
D O I
10.1093/ej/ueae032
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
I show that, in an extensive-form game, the outcomes that are consistent with iterated admissibility (i.e., with the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies) need not be consistent with extensive-form rationalizability.
引用
收藏
页码:3017 / 3026
页数:10
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-form Games with Unawareness
    Heifetz, Aviad
    Meier, Martin
    Schipper, Burkhard C.
    B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 2021, 21 (02): : 525 - 556
  • [2] LEXICOGRAPHIC RATIONALIZABILITY AND ITERATED ADMISSIBILITY
    STAHL, DO
    ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1995, 47 (02) : 155 - 159
  • [3] Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information
    Liu, Shuige
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2021, 50 (01) : 119 - 148
  • [4] Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information
    Shuige Liu
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2021, 50 : 119 - 148
  • [5] RATIONALITY IN EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES
    RENY, PJ
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 1992, 6 (04): : 103 - 118
  • [6] Timeability of Extensive-Form Games
    Jakobsen, Sune K.
    Sorensen, Troels B.
    Conitzer, Vincent
    ITCS'16: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 ACM CONFERENCE ON INNOVATIONS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE, 2016, : 191 - 199
  • [7] Computational Extensive-Form Games
    Halpern, Joseph Y.
    Pass, Rafael
    Seeman, Lior
    EC'16: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION, 2016, : 681 - 698
  • [8] Quantum extensive-form games
    Kazuki Ikeda
    Quantum Information Processing, 22
  • [9] Quantum extensive-form games
    Ikeda, Kazuki
    QUANTUM INFORMATION PROCESSING, 2023, 22 (01)
  • [10] Strategic negotiations for extensive-form games
    Dave de Jonge
    Dongmo Zhang
    Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2020, 34