Is More Always Better? Government Attention and Environmental Governance Efficiency: Empirical Evidence from China

被引:0
|
作者
Wang, Fengyu [1 ]
Zhou, Mi [2 ]
Yu, Huansheng [2 ]
机构
[1] Xuzhou Univ Technol, Coll Business, Xuzhou 221018, Peoples R China
[2] Shenyang Agr Univ, Coll Econ & Management, Shenyang 110866, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
government attention; air pollution; spatial econometric model; government work reports; environmental governance; CAMPAIGN-STYLE ENFORCEMENT; POLITICAL ATTENTION; AIR-POLLUTION; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.3390/su16167146
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
In recent years, the thorough implementation of China's green development concept has compelled local governments to devote more attention to environmental issues. This study aimed to verify whether increased government environmental attention (GEA) can sustainably ensure the implementation of environmental governance, particularly air pollution control. Using government work reports (GWRs) from local governments, this study employed machine learning methods to identify and quantify the attitudes of government officials as expressed in policy texts. A weighted dictionary method was used to quantify GEA from 2011 to 2016. The results of spatial econometric models indicated that air pollution exhibited positive spatial clustering effects across different regions, with the Yangtze River Delta and the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region being classified as high-high areas, while the western regions were classified as low-low areas. Baseline regression results showed that increased GEA can improve the effectiveness of pollution control, but excessive attention leads to a decline in governance efficiency. Overall, this study helps explain the unsustainability of campaign-style environmental governance and provides guidance for local governments on the rational allocation of attention when addressing environmental issues.
引用
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页数:17
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