Informal Institutions in Comparative Politics

Comparative politics has a rich tradition of analyzing informal institutions. Helmke and Levitsky advanced this research agenda by distinguishing informal institutions that arise within government, like corruption or patrimonialism, and those that operate in society, like custom and traditional forms of governance. 1 While Helmke and Levitsky's own research centered on norms within legislatures and country, a robust research tradition in comparative politics analyzes the consequences of informal institutions in political communities that are relatively independent from government control. 2 The latter tradition is captured by scholars like Elinor Ostrom and James Scott, both of whom emphasized that such communities are often able to govern their affairs without substantial government presence. 3 The three books reviewed contribute to the research agenda on informal institutions in comparative politics by showing that self -governance can be significant even in contexts where the state is present as well as by unpacking the mutually constitutive relationship between public and private orders in comparative politics.