Do Audit Committees and Auditors Coordinate Effort? Evidence from Risk Areas, Materiality, and Meetings

被引:0
|
作者
Livne, Gilad [1 ]
Tsipouridou, Maria [2 ]
Wood, Anthony [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bristol, Business Sch, Dept Accounting & Finance, Bristol, England
[2] Aristotle Univ Thessaloniki, Dept Econ, Div Business Adm, Thessaloniki, Greece
[3] Univ Exeter, Business Sch, Dept Accounting & Finance, Exeter, England
来源
ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2020年 / 99卷 / 03期
关键词
materiality; significant risks; audit committee; external auditor; audit effort coordination; service perspective on auditing;
D O I
10.2308/TAR-2020-0441
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We provide evidence on effort coordination and information sharing between audit committees and external auditors. We use four effort measures: the risk areas reported by both the auditor and committee, auditorreported materiality, and committee meetings. We find that the number of risks reported by the auditor (committee) is positively related to the number of risks reported by the committee (auditor) and that lower materiality is associated with more risks that the committee discloses. The evidence also suggests that although risk areas are "sticky," the committee identifies new risks faster, whereas the auditor focuses on shared risks. Next, our analysis indicates that audit process standardization influences reporting quality in a nonlinear manner. Finally, although audit fees tend to rise with auditor effort, they are unrelated to the committee's effort. Our findings endorse the service perspective on auditing by emphasizing the collaborative nature of the audit process over individual actors' self -interests.
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页码:349 / 372
页数:24
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