CHANCE, CREDENCE AND CIRCLES

被引：0

作者：

Cariani, Fabrizio ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

来源：

EPISTEME-A JOURNAL OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY | 2017年 / 14卷 / 01期

关键词：

PRINCIPAL PRINCIPLE; ACCURACY; BELIEF;

D O I：

10.1017/epi.2016.48

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

I target Pettigrew's application of the accuracy framework to derive chance-credence principles. My principal contention is that Pettigrew's preferred version of the argument might in one sense be circular and, moreover, that Pettigrew's premises have content that goes beyond that of standard chance-credence principles.

引用

页码：49 / 58

页数：10

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