Energy management for PV prosumers inside microgrids based on Stackelberg-Nash game considering demand response

This study investigates electricity trading in a deregulated retail market, aiming to coordinate the energy consumption behavior of end-users through demand response (DR) and carbon emission mechanisms under dynamic pricing. The objective is to minimize integrated energy system (IES) operating cost while maintaining a supply-demand balance. The IES schematic includes generation, dispatch, and consumption, as well as their physical and communication connections, corresponding to the grid, retailer, and multiple PV producers and consumers. Beyond the hierarchical decision-making between the retailer and PV prosumers, the challenge lies in the non-cooperative and competitive interdependence among prosumers. Therefore, the problem is formulated as a Stackelberg-Nash game (SNG) model, with the retailer as leader and PV prosumers as followers. Emphasizing that allowing fair energy trading between prosumers in the Nash game can have a positive impact on pricing decisions. Carbon trading and DR mechanisms enhance the flexibility of coordinating energy system supply-demand balance. An efficient iterative distributed algorithm is proposed for SNG strategy, it can complete real-time scheduling and privacy protection at the same time. Finally, the validity of the model is verified by a case study, which demonstrates that its effectiveness in adapting to changes in energy prices with practicality and economic benefits. Furthermore, we also show that the transactions between prosumers and the DR policies can reduce their operating costs by 12% and 9%, respectively.