REVISITING THE LIBERAL CASE AGAINST LIBERAL EUGENICS: HABERMAS ON THE FUTURE OF THE HUMAN SPECIES AND BIOTECHNOLOGY

In his book The Future of Human Nature , Habermas argues against the moral and legal permissibility of any future practices of genetic human enhancement as well as against current practices such as embryonic research or preimplantation genetic diagnosis. After analyzing the core of Habermas's argument against positive eugenics, I argue that his attempt to derive a principle of abstention under uncertainty from the principle of counterfactual consent assumes that non-interference is the proper default norm in the absence of consent. Yet, this cannot be a plausible default norm for parental relationships. Moreover, since Habermas agrees that the no -harm principle justifies negative eugenics, once technical possibilities of genetic manipulation become available, noninterference becomes as much in need of normative justification as interference. I conclude that if our normative innocence regarding positive eugenics must be lost for the sake of negative eugenics, then it is an innocence well lost.