Hardware Trojan detection based on self-differential analysis

被引：0

作者：

Zhang Y. ^{[1
]}

Quan H. ^{[2
]}

Li X. ^{[1
]}

Chen K. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Equipment Simulation Training Center, Shijiazhuang

[2] Department of Electrical and Optical Engineering, Army Engineering University (Shijiazhuang Campus), Shijiazhuang

来源：

Huazhong Keji Daxue Xuebao (Ziran Kexue Ban)/Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology (Natural Science Edition) | 2019年 / 47卷 / 02期

关键词：

Environmental noise; Hardware Trojan detection; Mahalanobis distance; Process noise; Self-differential analysis; Side-channel analysis;

D O I：

10.13245/j.hust.190218

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

To address the noise interference of side-channel based hardware Trojan detection methods, the self-differential analysis method was proposed. Two hypotheses were proposed based on the analysis of side-channel signal: a. The noise differences are very small in the same sampling window; b. There are differences among the side-channel signal under different activation. The self-differential analysis was carried out by differentiating the side-channel signal in the same sampling window but under different activation. The direct comparison between the golden chip and the chip under test was transformed to the relative comparison of self-differences, so as to suppress the process noise and environmental noise. Side-channel model and detection procedure for self-differential analysis were built. The field programmable gate array (FPGA) platform was set up and the 8051 microprocessor core was burned in. Mahalanobis distance was used to measure the differences of multipoint signals. The two hypotheses were verified in turn. The test set containing multiple hardware Trojans was constructed. The hardware Trojans with area of 0.025% were detected successfully. © 2019, Editorial Board of Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology. All right reserved.

引用

页码：98 / 102

页数：4

共 6 条

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