Low carbon technology innovation strategy of manufacturer under different market power structure

被引：0
|
作者：
Yu C. [1 ,2 ]
Wang C. [1 ]
Gao P. [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai
[2] School of Business, Jiangsu University of Technology, Changzhou
[3] School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang
来源：
Jisuanji Jicheng Zhizao Xitong/Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, CIMS | 2019年 / 25卷 / 02期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Government subsidy; Low carbon; Power structure; Stackelberg game; Technology innovation strategy;
D O I：
10.13196/j.cims.2019.02.022
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
To analyze the influence of different market power structure on low carbon technology innovation strategy in a supply market consisting of a low carbon product manufacturer (LM) and an ordinary product manufacturer (HM), the decision game models under three different situations, in which LM was market leader (LL), HM was market leader (HL) and no market leader (NL) were developed respectively. The results showed that the low carbon technology innovation level was negatively related to the innovation cost coefficient, and was positively related to the government subsidy; the government's innovative subsidies for manufacturers of low carbon products could share the inputs and risks of enterprises in the early stages of innovation; low carbon technology innovation level of LL mode was the best, NL mode followed and HL mode lowest; when low carbon technology innovation risk compensation was relatively large, LM should adopt active attack strategy, conversely, adopt active defense strategy; when innovation cost coefficient was lower, HM should adopt market share strategy, conversely, adopt active defense strategy. © 2019, Editorial Department of CIMS. All right reserved.
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页码：491 / 499
页数：8
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