Study on the diffusion of CCUS technology under carbon trading mechanism: Based on the perspective of tripartite evolutionary game among thermal power enterprises, government and public

被引:11
|
作者
Liu, Pingkuo [1 ,2 ]
Wu, Jiahao [1 ]
机构
[1] Shanghai Univ Elect Power, Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai 200090, Peoples R China
[2] Shanghai Univ Elect Power, Coll Econ & Management, Res Direct Energy Econ Elect Market Optimizat, Chifeng, Inner Mongolia, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
CCUS; Thermal power enterprises; Evolutionary game; Carbon trading mechanism; System dynamics; Simulation; CO2; CAPTURE; CHINA; CCS; STORAGE; PLANTS; COAL; INVESTMENT; PROJECT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.140730
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS), as a carbon emission reduction technology, is an important way for China to achieve the goal of "carbon peaking and carbon neutrality". Therefore, it is crucial to explore how to diffuse CCUS technology. Under the guidance of considering the carbon trading mechanism, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model of thermal power enterprises -government -public, discusses the evolutionary stability of each stakeholder and the dynamic evolution process of the system; then the simulation parameters are determined by the optimal power generation decision -making model based on Gounod's equilibrium; finally, the system dynamics (SD) model based on the evolutionary game is used for the simulation of the system's evolution paths, and the sensitivity analyses of the important parameters are carried out. The conclusions of the study are as follows: (1) Currently, the diffusion of CCUS technology in China is in the development stage, corresponding to the system equilibrium state of {investment, no incentives, no participation}, i.e., investment by thermal power generating enterprises, no incentives from the government, and no participation from the public. (2) The carbon trading market has guidance for the deployment of CCUS technology, and an appropriate reduction of carbon allowances and an increase in the unit price of carbon trading can stimulate the willingness of thermal power enterprises to invest in CCUS technology. (3) The choice of equilibrium strategy for thermal power enterprises is influenced by parameters and other stakeholders' initial strategies. Lower investment costs, higher carton emission reduction efficiency, moderate increases in penalties and subsidies, as well as a higher probability of government incentives and public participation in monitoring will increase the probability of thermal power enterprises investing in CCUS technology, and facilitate the evolution of the developmental stage {Investment, No incentive, No participation} to the ideal stage {Investment, Incentive, Participation}.
引用
收藏
页数:15
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