DISABILITIES, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE, AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY THE ROLE OF MINORITY MINDS IN COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION

This paper explores the implications of cognitive disability on deliberative democracy and proposes possible solutions to ensure that people with cognitive disabilities participate meaningfully in democratic decision making. Although deliberative democracy is considered a cognitive process, people with cognitive disabilities may lack the capacity to participate. The paper explores a joint-effort model of deliberation that includes people with cognitive disabilities as equal participants, using bodily communication as a source of information. However, we argue that it is too ambitious to include individuals with severe cognitive impairments who are unable to fully understand their position, critically analyze others' perspectives, and modify their opinions based on the epistemic contributions of other members. Therefore, we propose a model that recognizes the epistemic significance of individuals who do not meet the criteria for deliberators but can contribute as a useful source of information. The proposed model avoids epistemic and political injustices during deliberative processes and advocates proceduralist justification of deliberated outcomes. The paper highlights the need for inclusive deliberative processes that recognize the contributions of individuals with cognitive disabilities.