Contracting Out Local Government Services to Private Agents: An Analysis of Contract Design and Service Delivery Performance in Ghana

Contracting out is generally justified on the principle that as governments contract out part of their responsibilities in service provision to private agents, they harness the power of market competition which leads to efficiency in service provision. In working with private contractors, local governments (LGs) face problems related to agent opportunism, while agents also face risks such as dereliction of payment responsibility by LGs for services delivered. The literature shows that these problems are addressed through a web of contractual arrangements. Using agency theory, this study investigates the relationship between contract design and quality of services delivery in three Ghanaian cities (Accra, Kumasi and Tema). The study found a surprising negative correlation between contract document and agents' performance. The paper concludes that effectiveness of contracting out documents depends on contract management capacity of government administrators. In its absence, LGs that contract out are exposed to risks. The paper uses the findings to reflect on the inherent deficiencies in agency theory and Africanist literature on patronage.