CREDIBLE MINIMUM NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN SOUTH ASIA

The concept of Credible Minimum Deterrence has no definition and seems problematic in nature given its context of the Indo-Pakistan nuclear relationship. Though Pakistan does not aim, and cannot afford, to indulge in a nuclear arms race with India, it cannot be contended that a nuclear arms race does not exist between the two states. Quest for "credible minimum nuclear deterrence" may not be a finite goal as it is a dynamic concept itself, and even within either state, there is no consensus on what can be quantified as a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. In fact, the value of the concept possibly lies more in what it conceals rather than what it reveals providing yet more space for both sides to hide behind terms that are ambiguous. There have been many constructive suggestions on moving forward on a bilateral level which could be pursued-beginning with the clarification of basic nuclear concepts. It is argued here that both states should engage in a sustained nuclear dialogue that goes beyond rudimentary risk reduction measures.