ARE FOREIGN INVESTORS ATTRACTED TO POLITICALLY CONNECTED FIRMS?

被引:0
|
作者
Putantri, Amertya A. [1 ]
Nainggolan, Yunieta Anny [1 ]
Peranginangin, Yessy [2 ]
机构
[1] Inst Teknol Bandung, Jalan Ganesha 10, Bandung 40116, Indonesia
[2] Monash Univ, Clayton, Vic, Australia
来源
关键词
Foreign investment; Indonesian Political Connection; Jokowi Effect; Presidential election; Share ownership;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This research investigates whether 2014 Indonesia Presidential election, as an opportunity to examine political connection, could give any benefit/loss in terms of foreign investment - given the candidates were equally powerful. Based on the objective mentioned, this research analyzes the relationship between politically connected firms in Indonesia and their foreign share ownerships in one-year period (December 30, 2014 to December 31, 2014). This time bound is selected to represent the time before and after Jokowi-Prabowo 2014 presidential election. Politically connected firms in this research are divided into politically connected winning firms (Jokowi's party) and politically connected losing firms (Prabowo's party). In addition, this research also measures the effects of ownership structure, performance, size, and market value of the firms to foreign share ownership. Our findings show that politically winning firms have attracted foreign share ownership. However, it depends on the perspective of the investor (individual or institutional) and with whom the firm is connected. In 2014 Presidential election, where Jokowi was elected as the president, a firm where its board/shareholder is a parliament member of winning party impacts most on attracting foreign investment.
引用
收藏
页码:87 / 102
页数:16
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Politically connected firms
    Faccio, M
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2006, 96 (01): : 369 - 386
  • [2] Politically Connected Firms and the Environment
    Yu, Haowei
    Zhang, Lin
    [J]. B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 2022, 22 (02): : 579 - 602
  • [3] Politically connected firms in Spain
    Guerra Perez, Silvia
    Bona Sanchez, Carolina
    Santana Martin, Domingo Javier
    [J]. BRQ-BUSINESS RESEARCH QUARTERLY, 2015, 18 (04) : 230 - 245
  • [4] Institutional Investors' Monitoring and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from Politically Connected Firms
    Tee, Chwee Ming
    Yee, Angelina Seow Voon
    Chong, Aik Lee
    [J]. REVIEW OF PACIFIC BASIN FINANCIAL MARKETS AND POLICIES, 2018, 21 (04)
  • [5] Cash holdings of politically connected firms
    Boubakri, Narjess
    El Ghoul, Sadok
    Saffar, Walid
    [J]. JOURNAL OF MULTINATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 2013, 23 (04) : 338 - 355
  • [6] Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms
    Guedhami, Omrane
    Pittman, Jeffrey A.
    Saffar, Walid
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2014, 52 (01) : 107 - 162
  • [7] The economics of politically-connected firms
    Jay Pil Choi
    Marcel Thum
    [J]. International Tax and Public Finance, 2009, 16 : 605 - 620
  • [8] Stock Recommendations for Politically Connected Firms
    Alfonso, Elio
    [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, 2016, 43 (3-4) : 448 - 486
  • [9] The economics of politically-connected firms
    Choi, Jay Pil
    Thum, Marcel
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE, 2009, 16 (05) : 605 - 620
  • [10] Why do investors not punish politically connected firms for financial misrepresentation? A legitimacy-based perspective
    Yu, Xin
    Zheng, Ying
    [J]. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH JOURNAL, 2020, 33 (01) : 92 - 107