WAGE BARGAINING WITH ENDOGENOUS PROFITS, OVERTIME WORKING AND HETEROGENEOUS LABOR

被引：12
|
作者：
MUMFORD, K [1 ]
DOWRICK, S [1 ]
机构：
[1] AUSTRALIAN NATL UNIV,CANBERRA,ACT 2600,AUSTRALIA
来源：
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS | 1994年 / 76卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2109887
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper estimates the role of insider power in wage determination in a unionized industry, examining the direction and magnitude of biases which may arise through failure to control for variation in both hours of work and the composition of the labor force and through failure to control for the endogeneity of measured profits. Furthermore, by examining the extent to which rent-sharing is related to exogenous demand shocks rather than to potentially endogenous productivity, we provide a test of the bargaining and ''pure'' efficiency wage models. finding that the majority of the insider weighting can be explained by the bargaining model.
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页码：329 / 336
页数：8
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