REPEATED GAMES WITH ABSORBING STATES AND NO SIGNALS

被引：7
|
作者：
COULOMB, JM
机构：
[1] D. M. I., Paris, 75230
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1992年 / 21卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1007/BF01245459
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We recall the definition of stochastic games with signals. We show the existence of the MaxMin and MinMax if there is only one non absorbing state and if the players have no information about the other player's actions but only recall their own past moves.
引用
收藏
页码：161 / 174
页数：14
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