The Problem of Social Cost: What Problem? A Critique of the Reasoning of A.C. Pigou and R.H. Coase

被引:22
|
作者
Demsetz, Harold [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
关键词
Coase; Court; Externalities; Knight; Pigou; Strategic;
D O I
10.2202/1555-5879.1502
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
This essay discusses and refutes allegations by A.C. Pigou and R.H. Coase that a competitive, private-ownership economic system that conforms to the neoclassical model fails to allocate resources efficiently. The essay then suggests a source of inefficiency that differs from and is much more limited in application than are those offered by Pigou and Coase; and the suggested source, moreover, is compatible with the neoclassical model.
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页码:1 / 13
页数:13
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